Reflections on Abortion: A Roll of the Dice in Louisiana by Colker, Ruth
ESSAY
REFLECTIONS ON ABORTION: A ROLL OF
THE DICE IN LOUISIANA
Ruth Colker*
I. INTRODUCTION
T is hard to say anything new or different about the abortion contro-
versy. But I will make a modest attempt to develop a woman-centered
perspective on abortion, with particular application to the recently en-
acted Louisiana criminal abortion statute.1 This Essay is deeply political
and personal, as it draws on my own reproductive experiences.
Despite claims by the conservatives that the Supreme Court's relaxing of
the abortion-privacy standard would make the abortion debate less rhetori-
cal,2 there is no evidence of that result. I live in the heart of rhetoric-land -
the state of Louisiana - where I have seen the state pass legislation which
criminalizes nearly all abortions. In other essays, I have talked about the
need to develop "good faith" dialogue on the abortion issue. 3 A good faith
dialogue is one embedded in respect for the people affected by the issue
under discussion as well as the arguments made on each side of the issue. In
order for a good faith dialogue on the abortion issue to exist, pro-life advo-
cates must respect the well-being of women and pro-choice people must re-
spect the value of prenatal life. As I have discussed elsewhere, abortion
discussions rarely reflect such good faith.4 In the case of the Louisiana crim-
inal abortion statute, I tried to write a brief in the Fifth Circuit that engaged
in good faith dialogue on the abortion issue.5 While not denying the impor-
tance of valuing life in all its various forms, I try to show that the Louisiana
statute reflects enormous disrespect for women's well-being while not in-
creasing our valuation of life. Such disrespect, I argued, violates the sex-
* Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. 1991 La. Acts 26 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992)).
2. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 21,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) ("As long as the
various factions continue to look to the courts, however, a constructive dialogue will be
impossible.").
3. See Ruth Colker, Abortion & Dialogue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1363 n.1 (1989).
4. See Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed in
William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990).
5. Brief for Black Women for Choice et al. at 13-17, Sojourner T. v. Buddy Roemer, No.
91-3677 (5th Cir. filed on Oct. 18, 1991).
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equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In this Essay, I will not repeat all of my arguments to the Fifth Circuit. I
will try to explain, however, how the Louisiana statute is a shocking example
of the lack of respect for women's well-being that can be reflected in a so-
called pro-life position. That lack of respect for women's well-being is basic
to the statute's structure and substantive position. More subtly, however, I
will show how the statute profoundly reflects a man's rather than a woman's
experience of pregnancy. Given the virtual lack of women's representation
in the Louisiana legislature, the male-centered perspective should not sur-
prise us. Because, as I will argue, that male-centered perspective is pervasive
due to women's silence about their own pregnancies, I will try to break that
silence in this Essay. I hope that other women will join me and discuss their
pregnancies so that we can begin to remember rather than romanticize preg-
nancy and make the true realities of pregnancy a part of the public
consciousness.
6
II. LACK OF RESPECT FOR WOMEN
Four aspects of the Louisiana statute make it exceptionally regressive and
disrespectful of women's well-being. First, the statute attempts to prevent
termination of pregnancy "from the moment of conception."' 7 Because
nearly all birth control devices, aside from the diaphragm and condom, op-
erate between the time of conception (when the egg is fertilized) and implan-
tation (when the fertilized egg implants onto the uterine wall), the statute
would appear to ban most contraceptives. The statute would ban no contra-
ceptive used by men, but, interestingly, would ban the most popular devices
used by women, increasing women's dependence upon men. Irrespective of
how one feels about abortion, there is no excuse for preventing women from
having access to safe and effective contraception.
Second, the statute only provides for an abortion exception in the case
where a woman faces imminent death, rather than substantial harm to her
health, from continuation of her pregnancy.8 Nearly every other state and
western country that has passed an anti-abortion measure in the last century
has included a health exception. 9 Louisiana's decision to include an immi-
6. An excellent example of such a discussion of pregnancy is ADRIENNE RICH, OF WO-
MEN BORN (10th anniv. ed. 1986).
7. 1991 La. Acts 26 § 1 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992)).
8. Section 1B(2) provides an exception when the "physician terminates a pregnancy for
the express purpose of saving the life of the mother." Id. § 1 B(2) (codified at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:87B(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
9. The recently challenged Pennsylvania statute has an overriding umbrella clause which
contains a "medical emergency" exception. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3204 (1991). The recently
enacted Utah statute provides for an abortion exception in the event of rape or incest, grave
damage to the woman's health, or grave fetal defects. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(2)(1991).
Similarly, the recently enacted Guam statute provides an abortion exception when two physi-
cians determine that continuation of a pregnancy would impose a substantial risk to a pregnant
woman's life or health. 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 31.20 (1991). The European countries have
also been consistent in protecting women's health when regulating abortion. See generally
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nent death exception, but not a health exception, was quite deliberate. The
Louisiana Senate specifically rejected a health exception, which was reported
out of committee, by a vote of eight to thirty.10 In addition, the Louisiana
Senate rejected an abortion exception for women with HIV infection or
AIDS, which was also reported out of committee, by a vote of twelve to
twenty-six.II These votes were taken in the face of dramatic evidence about
the negative health implications of pregnancy for many women - women
with congestive heart failure, congenital heart disease, renal failure, kidney
disease, stage IV or V breast cancer, as well as HIV infection. 12 Thus, one
could say that the legislature consciously voted to shorten the life expec-
tancy of these women, as well as cause them to suffer dramatic health effects,
in order to protect the embryo at the moment of conception. It takes a tre-
mendous disrespect for the value of women's lives to insist that they undergo
compulsory childbirth and enormous, negative health consequences to pro-
tect embryonic life. It is therefore not surprising that Louisiana has the low-
est representation of women in the state legislature of any state (three
women in the House, and one woman in the Senate; not one of the women
voted to override the Governor's veto of the statute).
Third, the statute contains a virtually meaningless rape and incest excep-
tion. 13 A woman who is a victim of rape must go to doctor within five days
and seek medical treatment for venereal disease. (The rape victim, of course,
is expected to pay for this treatment.) The physician is also required to de-
termine whether she was already pregnant at the time that the rape oc-
curred, which is an impossible requirement if she had consensual intercourse
within two weeks of the rape. This physician may not be the physician who
later performs an abortion upon her, if she desires an abortion. Thus, she
must use a gynecologist, other than her personal gynecologist, to perform
the rape exam or the abortion, adding to her rape trauma. Additionally, the
woman must report the rape or incest to law enforcement authorities within
seven days. Aside from the unrealistic expectation that adult women be able
to comply with these requirements, imagine how unrealistic these require-
ments are for a twelve year old victim of incest. If each of these require-
ments has been met, the physician who has concluded that the pregnant
woman is a victim of rape or incest is permitted to perform an abortion
within thirteen weeks of conception. Of course, virtually no rape or incest
prosecutions occur within thirteen weeks of the alleged crime, so there is no
way a physician can know with certainty that he or she has performed an
abortion on an actual rape or incest victim, thereby allowing the physician to
avoid criminal liability for performing the abortion.
Rebecca Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies: Challenges and Opportunities, 3 INT'L J.
GYNECOL. OBSTET. 61, 62-65 (1989).
10. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 19 (June 4, 1991)
[hereinafter JOURNAL].
11. Id. at 14.
12. See, e.g., Testimony by Dr. Helen Ullrich before Louisiana Senate Committee on
Health and Welfare 38-39 (May 29, 1991).




Finally, the statute exempts from its coverage women who self-induce
abortions. 14 No justification consistent with the statute's purported objec-
tive can explain this exception. Self-induced abortions are likely to destroy
both the woman's and fetus' lives. On the other hand, such an exception
supports a nineteenth century "pedestal" view of women by leaving them
free from the criminal law.
Louisiana purports to have enacted this statute to protect life. But as the
statute aptly says in its preamble, the legislature was only concerned about
life from the moment of conception until birth. Unfortunately, the alleged
concern did not extend to the period after birth. Louisiana ranks nearly last
in the United States in infant mortality, low birth weight babies, and lack of
prenatal care.' 5 Nevertheless, the Louisiana Senate rejected an amendment
to the abortion statute, by a vote of fourteen to twenty-three, that would
have raised the Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women and their children. ' 6
Rather than do anything meaningful to assist the women or children of the
state, Louisiana chose to impose compulsory childbirth upon women.
Louisiana has not voluntarily moved into the twentieth century in the area
of gender relations. It was not until 1979, under court order, that Louisiana
got rid of its "head and master" statute, thereby giving married women the
opportunity to control their marital property.' 7 The recently enacted Loui-
siana criminal abortion statute is unfortunately an attempt to return the wo-
men of Louisiana to their nineteenth century role in society.
In the Supreme Court's recent Webster v. Reproductive Health Services '8
decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that women need not worry
about the states having increased power to regulate abortion. 19 Given wo-
men's numerical majority in society, he predicted that the Supreme Court's
recent, conservative decisions in the abortion area would not be treated by
state legislatures as "an invitation to enact abortion regulations reminiscent
of the dark ages." 20 Unfortunately, Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to com-
prehend that the Louisiana legislature would try to move the clock back to
the dark ages, endangering the lives of women. The Governor of Louisiana,
Buddy Roemer, vetoed the Louisiana statute, stating that it "dishonors wo-
men." 2' The legislature, however, chose to continue that dishonor by over-
riding his veto. Unless the federal courts choose to protect the lives and
health of the women of Louisiana, they will be facing much worse results
than dishonor.
Thus, we can readily conclude that the statute fails to respect women's
well-being. It does not purport to respect women, nor does it. As I have
14. Id. § 1A(2) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87A(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
15. See Statement of Senator Cleo Fields before Louisiana Senate Committee on Health
and Welfare 49 (May 29, 1991).
16. JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 48-49.
17. See 1978 La. Acts 627, repealed by 1979 La. Acts 709 § 5 replaced by 1979 La. Acts
709, 710, 711; see also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
18. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
19. Id. at 521.
20. Id.
21. N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at Al.
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argued elsewhere, such profound disrespect for women's well-being should




So far, I have relied on the kinds of arguments that I made to the Fifth
Circuit in the Louisiana abortion case. I now turn to some more personal
arguments that I did not make in court but I believe also help demonstrate
the male-centered nature of the Louisiana statute. This more personal dis-
course discusses the statute's lack of a woman-centered perspective.
Before doing so, I need to offer a few caveats. First, I worry about the
kind of argument that I am now going to make, because it sounds so biologi-
cal. Biological arguments about women's physical autonomy should not be
the basis of a pro-choice perspective 23 because women should seek group-
based rather than individualistic arguments about reproductive health.
Moreover, I can hear my critics responding that my personal arguments
sound "essentialist" to the extent that they rely on biological observations.
And essentialism has become one of the dirty words within the feminist
movement. Before offering some personal observations, then, I need to ex-
plain why these observations are not overly biological or essentialist.
Undoubtedly, the experience of pregnancy has a biological component.
More importantly, however, society has helped construct the experience of
pregnancy in the way that it treats pregnant women. For example, nausea
during pregnancy is a physical experience. I would argue that nausea be-
comes hidden and trivialized by labelling it as "morning sickness," thereby
suggesting that it only occurs in the morning; by expecting women to work
during, at least, the first eight months of pregnancy; and by telling women
not to disclose the fact of their pregnancy until the end of the first trimester.
In talking about the physical experience of pregnancy, I try to show how
society modifies and characterizes that physical experience through its rules,
regulations, and attitudes. I am therefore talking about the social construc-
tion of the physical condition of pregnancy rather than the innate physical
condition itself. As with most aspects of women's biology, we have little
idea what that biology would be in the absence of social construction.
The other problematic, essentialist aspect of my argument that follows is
that it is highly individualistic. Certainly, not all women experience preg-
nancy exactly as I have. My social class, for example, has greatly lessened
the hardships of pregnancy for me. I have been able to receive excellent
medical treatment while working in a relatively nonstressful environment
while pregnant. Elsewhere, I have discussed the experience of pregnancy for
adolescent females24 and, therefore, understand how privileged my experi-
22. See, Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324.
23. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989).
24. See Colker, supra note 22.
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ence has been in comparison with other women. My experience is one
among many, although I believe that it does share many core similarities
with that of other women about whom I have read or described elsewhere.
Finally, I should note that I did not consider it appropriate or useful to
offer my more personal comments in my brief to the Fifth Circuit. Techni-
cally, such arguments would have been inappropriate, because I was pur-
portedly representing others rather than myself. Even if I were a named
plaintiff or party, however, I doubt that I would have felt comfortable put-
ting such personal arguments in a brief. It would have been easier to make
such personal arguments through the testimony of my clients. Because the
trial court judge entered his decision enjoining the enforcement of the Loui-
siana statute without a trial, there are virtually no personal facts in the rec-
ord for the purposes of this litigation.25 I believe that such procedural
developments hamper attempts by feminists to develop respect for women's
well-being and perspective as part of their case. Unfortunately, there is little
that feminist litigators can do about that problem in the face of a hostile
judge who denies them the opportunity to develop a factual record. We
therefore must use other avenues, like the pages of this law review, to de-
velop such facts.
I have watched the rhetoric in Louisiana over the last year while exper-
iencing three pregnancies. The first two ended in spontaneous abortions 26 -
at weeks six and eleven. The third pregnancy has ended successfully with
the birth of a child. Of the last twenty months of my life, I have spent all but
five of those months pregnant. I have been nauseous27 and exhausted and
frequently wondered why I kept choosing to get pregnant. I had to await the
results of an amniocentesis test for my latest pregnancy while realizing how
difficult it would be, despite the court's injunction, to obtain a second trimes-
ter abortion in Louisiana (if that was my choice). The previous two
pregnancies apparently produced nonviable fetuses that nature had a way of
eliminating. As traumatic as those spontaneous abortions were, I felt thank-
25. The plaintiffs consistently sought a trial to develop a factual record; I would suggest
that the absence of a trial was a deliberate move on the part of the judge to hamper them on
appeal.
26. I am deliberately not using the term "miscarriage." I believe that people refer to
spontaneous abortions as miscarriages in order to avoid acknowledging morally that they have
experienced an abortion. It is true that some abortions are chosen by nature and others by
women; however, they all achieve the same result - the abortion of a fetus from a woman's
body. Because the purpose of this Essay is to get people to think connectedly about all first
trimester abortions (spontaneous or elective), I do not want to use the misleading term "mis-
carriage" in this Essay.
27. As many pregnant women can tell you, "morning sickness" is a misnomer. For many
women, like myself, the morning is really the only good time of day. I typically wake up
feeling alright - at least good enough to eat a modest breakfast and keep it in my system. At
about 1I a.m., nausea starts getting much worse, and grows progressively worse throughout
the day. From week four to twelve of my pregnancy, I typically vomited once per day except
for the dozen or so days when I vomited two to three times. Although I am tall and thin, and
had gained four inches in my waist, I also managed to lose ten pounds during this time period.
During this time period, I also typically slept twelve to eighteen hours per day. Of course, this
only describes the first trimester of a so-called normal pregnancy. Women with a much more
severe physical response to pregnancy than I have experienced will be coerced by the Louisi-
ana legislature into continuing with their pregnancies.
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ful not to be burdened with the responsibilities of raising a severely handi-
capped child who would probably have lived a short life filled with suffering.
Because nature resolved those pregnancies in favor of abortion, I did not
have to make a morally painful decision about those pregnancies.
After one of my spontaneous abortions, the doctor performed a "D&C," a
procedure that is strikingly similar to an elective abortion procedure. The
difference, some people might argue, is that my D&C was performed on fetal
tissue that was not potentially viable. But, had I chosen an abortion earlier
in my pregnancy, it turns out that that abortion would still have been per-
formed on fetal tissue that was not potentially viable. I was, in fact, not
carrying a potentially viable fetus. The state of Louisiana would allow a
doctor to further abort a fetus after my body spontaneously aborted it but
would not allow a doctor to abort it before my body spontaneously aborted
it. 2
8
From my own experience with spontaneous abortions, I would like to
make a simple argument - it is unfair and morally unacceptable not to give
women the choice of electing an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy.
I have several justifications for this view.
First, let's think about the first trimester of pregnancy. Society tells wo-
men not to tell anyone that they are pregnant until the end of the first tri-
mester when the high risk of spontaneous abortions passes. Believe me, the
first trimester is terribly difficult for most women. Even if women are not
nauseous, they are extremely exhausted. Moreover, if women are well-in-
formed about pregnancy, they know that they have a relatively high risk of
spontaneous abortion, estimated to be between fifteen and thirty percent,
depending upon whom you ask.
2 9
The result is quite convenient for a society that doesn't want to deal with
the difficulties of women's pregnancies. Virtually no one knows that the wo-
man is pregnant during the first trimester. If she has a spontaneous abor-
tion, then she must suffer in silence. We can conveniently expect the
pregnant woman to keep performing her normal duties inside and outside
the home during her pregnancy. In addition, most men and many women
stay ignorant of the realities of the first trimester of pregnancy since they are
rarely confronted with the pregnancy experiences of women during that time
period. Thus, the high rate of spontaneous abortions is a relatively unknown
fact.
Now, let's re-examine those facts from the perspective of a woman who
does not desire her pregnancy to continue. If Louisiana is successful in con-
vincing the courts to overturn Roe v. Wade,3 0 then a pregnant woman will
have no real choices during her pregnancy. If she desires an abortion but
doesn't want to break the law or cannot afford to travel to another state to
28. Section 1B(1) provides that a physician may terminate a pregnancy in order "to re-
move a dead unborn child." 1991 La. Acts 26 § IB(l) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:87B(1) (West Supp. 1992)).
29. These estimates are based on discussions with three different gynecologist that I have
seen during the course of my pregnancies as well as general reading on the subject.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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procure an abortion, then her only "choice" is to wait and see whether na-
ture spontaneously aborts her fetus. For about one-fifth of those women,
nature will achieve her desired choice. For the remaining four-fifths, the
only alternative is bearing an unwanted child.
The state of Louisiana gives a pregnant woman who does not desire to
continue with her pregnancy the incentive to do whatever she can to induce
a spontaneous abortion, even if those steps might harm or endanger her own
life or future reproductive capacity. 31 And why is she forced to take those
steps? Because she is too poor to travel to another state where she can pro-
cure a legal abortion and she is not "lucky" enough to have experienced a
spontaneous abortion. The next twenty years of her life will be dramatically
affected by those fortuities.
Let us also think about this scenario from the perspective of the Supreme
Court's favorite abortion buzz phrase - potential life. If the Supreme Court
overturns Roe v. Wade and upholds the Louisiana statute, it will be because
the state is constitutionally entitled to value the potential life of the fetus
over the woman's right to privacy, equal protection, etc. But, in what sense
is a fetus actually potential life in the first trimester? Nature spontaneously
aborts more than one-fifth of all pregnancies. From the perspective of a
pregnant woman who is well-informed about reproductive health, there is, at
best, a possibility of life but not a real potential for life, until the first trimes-
ter is completed.
This last observation takes me back to my earlier remarks about the first
trimester of pregnancy. Society's conditioning of women to remain silent
about their first trimester of pregnancy and spontaneous abortions leads
most men to be entirely ignorant of those biological facts. That silence con-
tributes conveniently to a male mode of pregnancy which sees all pregnant
women as carrying potential life. In fact, one cannot be confident that wo-
men are carrying potential life until the fifteenth week of pregnancy. And,
for women over thirty-five, and especially women over forty, one cannot be
certain that they are carrying a potential life until the woman receives her
amniocentesis results at about week nineteen of pregnancy.
In Louisiana, we have four women in the state legislature - three in the
House of Representatives and one in the Senate. Two of these women were
elected to their positions in the last year. It, therefore, does not surprise me
that the legislature knows virtually nothing about women's reproductive
health or well-being. It does not surprise me that the legislature uses a male
model of pregnancy which denies the fragility of women's pregnancies for, at
least, the first trimester.
The ignorance and disrespect of the Louisiana legislature became more
obvious to me when I had the opportunity to debate a state legislator on the
Louisiana abortion statute at Tulane Law School. I kept trying to argue
from a woman-centered perspective, pointing out the numerous ways that
31. A self-induced abortion is lawful under the statute. 1991 La. Acts 26 § 1A(2) (codi-
fied at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992)).
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the statute would harm women's health and well-being. 32
The legislator responded to my health arguments by repeatedly stating
that, if there was a health exception, that a woman who was thirty-nine
weeks pregnant would seek an abortion due to a headache! Obviously, his
statement reflected no trust and respect for women. In addition, however, it
reflected a complete ignorance of the pain that nearly all women experience
to make it to week thirty-nine of pregnancy. His comment suggested that
the headache was her first indication of discomfort so that she would decide
to whimsically abort the fetus at that point. It is hard for me to imagine that
a woman would get to week thirty-nine without much more severe discom-
fort than a headache. Clearly, his fear was that we might actually have to
acknowledge all of those discomforts - recognize that pregnancy is not nec-
essarily an easy and joyful process. By demeaning women's claims of dis-
comfort during pregnancy, he wanted to cut off all opportunity for women
to raise those discomforts as justifications for an abortion.
33
I feel very sorry for my poor sisters in Louisiana who are facing an un-
wanted pregnancy and must leave their fate to a vindictive state legislature
that does not want to have to hear about their experience of pregnancy,
childbirth, and child care. These women must leave the fate of their
pregnancies to nature's roll of the dice, not being able to afford to travel to
another state to procure a safe and lawful abortion. Maybe it is not surpris-
ing that Louisiana legalized gambling in the same session that it criminalized
abortion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Louisiana criminal abortion statute is male-centered in two important
but different senses. It quite starkly fails to respect women's well-being. In
addition, it ignores a woman's experience of the fragility of pregnancy, espe-
cially during the first trimester. I was always told that a woman could not
be a "little bit pregnant." In fact, women are a little bit pregnant until their
pregnancy passes the high rate of spontaneous abortion at the end of the first
trimester. If we had a better understanding of the fragility as well as the
discomfort of pregnancy, we might not be so quick to respond to the fact of
women's pregnancy with such harsh and absolute rules.
32. I also refused to allow the legislator to call me "pro- abortion" and eventually resorted
to the emotional and personal tactic of standing up with my pregnancy in full view and saying
that if I were pro-abortion that I clearly would not be pregnant! That response did force him
to start characterizing my position as pro-choice - a minor but important concession.
33. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90, as amended by 1991 La. Acts 158, 289, 753.
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